I. INTRODUCTION
Both philosophers (Hofmann, 2007; Schmaus, 1983 Schmaus, , 1984 and sociologists (Merton, 1942; Zuckerman, 1977 Zuckerman, , 1984 have asked, in their different ways, what is acceptable scientific behavior. Whether certain deeds should be punished is not their main concern (even though it may follow from other considerations). On the other hand, scientists, politicians, and lawyers have focused on sanctions for misconduct.
1 There is little interaction between the two: Guston (1999) found that, as public policies changed with time, so did the underlying conception of scientific norms. But policy makers did not always notice that a different policy likely means a different construal of scientific fraud; in fact certain policies may not correspond to any coherent theory at all. Policies are essentially ad hoc: inclusion or exclusion of certain deeds as scientific misconduct does not come from a careful and consistent argumentation.
To Dooley and Kerch (2000) , "scientific misconduct includes fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism (FFP) of concepts, data or ideas; some institutions in the United States have expanded this concept to include 'other serious deviations (OSD) from accepted research practice' " (emphasis added). 'Misconduct' simply means bad behavior, which is quite general. It thus seems that scientific misconduct should be anything that is wrong, not just fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism. In other words, it is the limitation of misconduct to three kinds of acts that requires justification.
2 But whether to include "other serious deviations" is not seen as making a decision regarding what is wrong but rather as a matter of what would make for a more enforceable rule. Dooley and Kerch indeed note that "CRI [the U.S. Commission on Research Integrity] endorsed what it claimed to be a more legally enforceable definition of scientific misconduct" and "more in line with the nation's legal system than with the practice of science." Goldner (1998) notes that "the general trend over the past decade has been away from a primarily scientist-run process toward one in which lawyers have played an increasingly crucial role." One can also remark that a great deal of the literature is dedicated to the history of the bureaucracy and of the judicial processes related to research misconduct (e.g. Dooley and Kerch, 2000; Goldner, 1998; LaFollette, 1994; Mishkin, 1999; Pascal, 1999; Price, 1994) rather than to questions of what is wrong and why. (These are not intrinsically legal issues, they have been made so in the U.S. in part because about anything there ends up decided by a tribunal.) The search for a "government-wide" definition of research misconduct (e.g. Mishkin, 1999; Price, 1994) , rather than of a science-wide definition, takes the question to be essentially administrative: the important difference is not between sciences but between administrations.
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Research fraud is often presented as a waste of public money, and "surely the public has a right to presume that its tax money is being spent wisely" (Redman and Caplan, 2005) . (There is a general trend making funding central, e.g. to retention and promotion -rather than funding being a means to do good science, it seems that science is turning into a means to secure funding.) One should note that a government cannot fire researchers (other than those it directly employs), it cannot prevent anyone from writing in journals or from attending conferences; the only thing it can do is cut funds. The reason why fraud is punished by funding debarment is not that those who sinned by misuse of funds shall perish by funding debarment, but simply because this is about the only way a government can concretely punish researchers -short of making research misconduct a crime, which only a few (e.g. Redman and Caplan, 2005; Sovacool, 2005) would endorse. Waste of public money is not a serious argument against scientific fraud (as I shall show in greater detail in the next section) but rather a rationalization, a way of justifying the power of investigation of funding agencies. The idea that research misconduct shall be an administrative and legalistic issue precedes the question of why it is wrong.
The concern has generally been action rather than reflection, enforcing rules instead of justifying themprocedures (due process, whistle-blower protection) and sanctions. There has been little effort to justify prosecuting certain deeds rather than others (many articles offer no justification at all). However, one cannot choose a practical definition of fraud (i.e. a list of banned practices) independently of why fraud is supposed to be wrong. The underlying problem is that when one takes something to be obviously wrong one tends not to scrutinize one's arguments too closely (Bouville, 2008a,b) . In the upcoming section, I look at which practices can indeed be considered unacceptable based on the arguments most commonly offered against research misconduct, and find that current policies do not correspond to any argument against scientific misconduct. I then look at the issue of sanctions, in particular whether they are consistent with what is supposed to justify them: again I show that policies are set independently of the reasons why fraud is supposed to be wrong. I finally consider the question of honesty, and argue that society cannot set a standard of honesty for scientists, so that even if scientists indeed should be honest society cannot legitimately enforce such a standard.
II. WHICH PRACTICES ARE WRONG AND WHY?
A. Why is scientific fraud wrong?
The simplest argument against fraud is that it can "directly and negatively impact the integrity of the research record" (Dooley and Kerch, 2000) , i.e. "of what is presented as scientific facts" (Forsman, 1999) . Research is supposed to create new knowledge, so what is published must be true: scientific journals are not supposed to publish fiction. Another issue is that scientific fraud is incompatible with the necessary "moral integrity of scientists" (Merton, 1942) , and more specifically with "the institutional goal of extending certified knowledge" (Zuckerman, 1984) . Scientists are supposed to honestly seek truth and to aim at creating new knowledge. Babbage (1830) writes: "I feel that I shall deserve the thanks of all who really value truth, by stating some of the methods of deceiving practised by unworthy claimants for its honours." It is often mentioned that scientific misconduct can harm the population; for instance, a fraudulent report that a given medicine has no side effect may expose those taking it to unexpected harm. A last point is 3 Some say that, since science is international, purely national policies are too limited. Travis (2008) takes the example of "a peer reviewer for a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant proposal [who] recognized ideas and text within the proposal that she had originally written and submitted to a U.K. funding agency." Investigation was impossible because "the U.K. agency regarded the proposal as confidential and argued that it couldn't be shared." Travis wishes to "streamline international research misconduct investigations." The model is something like Interpol: sharing information, evidence, and so on. This hints that scientific misconduct is seen as an administrative or police matter rather than a matter of science. Science is not inter-national -it is a collaboration not between nations but beside them. Science cannot be inter-nationalized because it does not start at the scale of a country to work its way up to the inter-national level -this is what administrations, not science, do.
that fraud allows some to receive more than they deserve (e.g. promotion or awards) by increasing the number or the impact of their publications. The five arguments of scientific record, honesty, waste of funds, harm to the population and undeserved rewards are supposed to show that scientific misconduct is wrong. I will scrutinize them to determine exactly what kinds of deeds they can show to be wrong and to find out whether they have undesirable consequences (e.g. making too many things wrong). But one must also ask whether we should give any weight to these arguments at all. While it is obvious that knowledge is at the heart of science, so that invalid information is incompatible with the very definition of science, arguments such as waste of money and undeserved rewards construe science as a purely social activity. That science is indeed a social activity does not necessarily entail that this aspect of it is crucial. Arguments of this kind consider that science is essentially an expense or a source of social recognition; but this requires some argumentation. Furthermore, those holding such a view of science must be consistent and endorse the consequences of this construal -an obvious risk is that scientific fraud may not be a matter of science at all but rather a financial or managerial matter, but then why should it be of importance to scientists? The question of honesty is not self-evident either. If one says that honesty is necessary to reach the truth then it is just a means, i.e. honesty is necessary inasmuch as one cannot reach the truth without it; but this seems to be another version of the scientific record argument, rather than a separate viewpoint. One may alternatively say that honesty is required for its own sake, but this requires justification (if one can create knowledge without honesty, why is honesty necessary?) -this will be the subject of the 'Need scientists be honest?' section.
B. Incriminated practices
The three big players of research fraud are fabrication, falsification and plagiarism (FFP). The first two are similar in that they correspond to the publication of results that intentionally misrepresent reality. About all criteria for the wrongness of research misconduct conclude that fabrication and falsification are wrong. However, it is not obvious that they waste funding: someone who fails to obtain interesting results and falsifies data to boost their value does not waste any more funds than someone who fails to obtain interesting results and decides not to publish anything. It is not fabrication and falsification that waste money, rather they tend to follow closely after waste of money (unsuccessful research): in general, fabrication and falsification are the consequence of wasted money rather than the other way around. If they waste money, it can only be indirectly: others will unsuccessfully try to build upon fake results, thus wasting funds. But this applies mostly to the higher-profile cases: many papers do not attract enough attention to have such negative consequences. Whether fabrication and falsification waste money can only be decided case by case.
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Plagiarism means passing off someone else's work as one's own. Plagiarism affects our knowledge of who did what rather than our knowledge of the world (the subject matter of science), making it less incompatible with scientific standards than the publication of inaccurate results: "the introduction of fraudulent evidence is more seriously at odds with the institutional goal of extending certified knowledge than is the publication of plagiarized but reliable evidence" (Zuckerman, 1984) . In fact plagiarism can even help to spread valid information by multiplying sources. Plagiarism does not use any money: plagiarism is the absence of work, it takes no time and no resource (it is precisely this absence of work that makes it wrong). So a fortiori plagiarism does not waste any public funds. Plagiarism does not harm the population at large since the results are correct. The main impact of plagiarism is that plagiarists will be overestimated because their publication list is unduly impressive, which skews promotion and award procedures. (One should nonetheless note that fraud can bias promotion and awards only if it is massive: one is unlikely to receive an award for one fraudulent paper in a low-profile journal.)
Practices that are often frowned upon are redundant publications, 'self-plagiarism,' and 'salami slicing' (i.e. publishing many papers where one would have been enough) and unwarranted authorship. In bold are cases conflicting with current policies. * : these are held to be wrong but may not be prosecuted as 'scientific misconduct' (rules may vary by country, etc.).
† : there is a correlation between prosecution and waste of funds (see footnote 4).
that are published are genuine. The main issue is (as with plagiarism) that one's publication list may be undeservedly long.
Certain results may be obtained from human subjects who had not consented to being part of an experiment or from animals that were mistreated in the process. One should note that mistreating subjects does not affect the truthfulness of the research and of publications, neither does it harm the population at large or waste money. Mistreatment is simply a separate issue and one must argue against it using specific arguments. (The same is true of the mishandling of hazardous materials and similar issues.)
C. Side effects
After looking at whether arguments against scientific misconduct justify banning certain practices, I now turn to the question of whether they make collateral damages, i.e. whether they make wrong things that are generally not so considered. Table I provides a summary.
An important issue is whether false results coming from an intent to deceive are to be treated differently from those that are due to involuntary errors, carelessness or chance. Honest errors do not mean that the scientist was not honestly seeking truth, but they do adversely affect scientific records, waste funds, and they may harm the population or get someone undeserved rewards. In other words, most arguments should hold honest errors to be as wrong as fabrication or falsification. Honest errors may in fact be more problematic, simply because they are far more common than voluntary deception (Bouville, 2008c) . One should notice that any error can have negative consequences: not only the intentional, not even only the reckless or the negligent: even an error made in spite of extraordinary caution can damage the scientific record, waste money, hurt the population, and garner undeserved rewards. Prosecuting the unlucky is then as justified as prosecuting the dishonest -surprisingly this obvious conclusion is seldom reached.
The harm to the population argument applies essentially to medical research (fake cosmology data will not harm anyone, for instance), so it cannot be used against research misconduct in general -it would mean that some fields would be necessarily devoid of misconduct. One should also note that one study should not be able to cause much harm, since something that may cause much harm should receive much attention (verification, repetition), so that a work that can single-handedly cause much harm can do so only through the actions or inaction of others (i.e. it cannot be single-handed).
In some cases the wrongness of fraud does not justify trying to reduce it. This is obvious in the case of the wasting of funding: investigation and prosecution of fraud can be more costly than fraud itself. From a financial viewpoint comes a point where one should stop fighting fraud. Similarly if one is very careful not to publish erroneous results one may have to dedicate so much time to verifications as to finally create less knowledge. For the same reason making sure that erroneous results do not harm the population can stall new discoveries that would have benefited the population. These trade-offs will be more fully addressed in the next section.
A last point is that if something is wrong because it has certain negative consequences then anything with the same consequences (within or without science) is wrong. A government cutting health care budgets does more harm to public health than all scientific fraud combined. Likewise, scientific misconduct is a tiny source of loss of public funding: if efficient use of public funds is really the issue then one should look at billions rather than at spare change. The war on Iraq cost the U.S. trillions of dollars (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008) and not even the most faithful believer can deny that there were many mistakes, costing billions of dollars and many human lives. If one really means to save public funds then what really wastes them should be the priority, not scientific misconduct. One should also bear in mind that research is intrinsically a very wasteful and inefficient activity: success is always preceded by many shots in the dark and many failures -misconduct is just a drop in this ocean.
D. Examples
After looking at which acts are wrong according to various arguments against research misconduct, I will now compare pairs of scientists. Author A copied an article verbatim and published it in a marginal journal, where nobody read it. Author B is both honest and careful but nevertheless made an error and thus published results that mistakenly hold a certain drug (now used by millions) to be harmless; this work made B famous. Unlike A, B published results that are false, wasted money, harmed people and garnered undeserved rewards. A is guilty of scientific misconduct.
Author C did not feel like doing actual work and simply made stuff up, the ensuing article had no impact. The research of D failed to generate any result, so D did not publish anything. Neither C nor D harmed anyone or received unmerited distinctions; D wasted money while C did not. C is guilty of scientific misconduct.
One can also compare researchers B and D. Neither was dishonest but both wasted funds, and scientist B published invalid results, harmed the population, and received undeserved rewards. Neither researcher would be considered guilty of scientific misconduct.
E is the serious researcher next door: E's articles are honest, essentially error-free and of moderate interest. F copied a fairly recent paper that went unnoticed in spite of its great merits; these merits were finally recognized (and attributed to F) and research has recently developed in a very promising direction. Neither E nor F published false data, only F's article was of great benefit to science and to the population at large (and at absolutely no cost!). Arguably, F should be rewarded for furthering the goals of science. F is guilty of scientific misconduct.
Author G (who is not a native speaker of English) oftentimes copies paragraphs from the background and method sections of other people's articles in order to ensure clarity of these descriptions (the methods themselves are well-established); G's results are genuine and they have had very beneficial outcomes. G is not trying to steal from others but simply to improve the clarity of his articles. The few paragraphs G copied cost no money, garnered no unwarranted reward, and did not affect the scientific record. G's research had positive consequences for the population. G is guilty of scientific misconduct.
H gave an untested drug to patients without their consent; it turns out that this medicine did not harm them and is even the only known cure to a certain disease. The only difference between E and H is that H's research was greatly beneficial to the population, unlike that of E. H's behavior would be considered wrong (but H may not be prosecuted).
There is a dramatic difference between current policies and the outcomes of arguments against fraud, as summed up in Table II . When one looks away from black and white archetypes, one has to acknowledge that no single argument against research misconduct seems to capture the many aspects (positive and negative) of the behaviors of these scientists and of their consequences. The crude rules that seem to be favored by the majority may discriminate between researchers that exhibit no major difference, and they may even punish the one who benefited science or the whole of society.
III. SANCTIONS
Bernard Williams (1985, p. 177) noted that "blame is the characteristic reaction of the morality system." The First World Conference on Research Integrity held in September 2007 in Portugal used the picture of a hand-cuffed Erlenmeyer flask as a logo of sorts (see http://tinyurl.com/2odvre) and Redman and Caplan (2005) entitled their article "Off with their heads!". Punishment is indeed what everyone obviously cares about. Birgitta Forsman (1999) , who believes that "the most important thing is not to punish scientists who have done something wrong," must feel lonely. In bold are cases conflicting with current policies. 'Neither' and 'both' respectively mean that neither researcher and both researchers did something wrong. * : mistreatment of human subjects is held to be wrong but may not be prosecuted as 'scientific misconduct' (rules may vary by country, etc.). E † : it is not that E did something bad, rather others did something good, making E the worse of the two.
A. Consistency and relevance of sanctions
Since sanctions are the main concern, discussions revolve around what is prosecutable rather than around what is wrong. It may be impossible to prove intent but possible to show that someone's actions were at least reckless. Punishing recklessness may then be used as a tactic to punish those who intended to deceive but could not be proven so -"because proving intent is very difficult, the addition of 'committed. . . in reckless disregard of accepted practices' was identified as an improvement in the policy" (Bird and Dustira, 2000) . But the fact that intent is hard to prove does not entail that one should include reckless errors along with intentional ones. One should prosecute people because they did something wrong, not because it is easy to prosecute them. Recklessness should be treated as wrong only if it is wrong (and if it is believed to be wrong, one must provide arguments in this sense). What kind of justice does one get when one prosecutes based on convenience rather than based on wrongness?
The sanction should be relevant to the wrongdoing: the nature of the punishment must depend on what one considers to be the nature of the crime. If fraud is a waste of fund then funding debarment seems an adequate answer. On the other hand, one may wonder why funding agencies should debar a plagiarist from funding, since plagiarism does not waste their money, it does not affect the creation of new knowledge, and it has no adverse effect on the population at large -put colloquially: it's none of their business. If a plagiarist received an undeserved promotion or if an award was obtained for fabricated data, these may be rescinded. But if the plagiarist would have been promoted anyway (e.g. his other work would justify promotion) then, in order to cancel the promotion (let alone fire the researcher), one must claim that plagiarism is intrinsically wrong and that plagiarists should be sanctioned in any case, i.e. one must invoke an argument other than that of undeserved promotion. If the argument is 'without the fraudulent articles they would not have been promoted' then the promotion can be canceled (based on this argument) only if it is true that they would not have been promoted in the absence of the fraudulent papers.
Just like a given argument against scientific misconduct can make certain behaviors wrong but not others, it can justify certain kinds of sanctions but not others. Neither consistency requirement seems to have really been taken into account so far, so that both the kinds of deeds that are incriminated and the sanctions against them tend to be inconsistent with arguments supposed to justify these sanctions.
B. Consequences of sanctions
What is the concrete effect of a one-year debarment from funding? None for someone about to take a sabbatical leave, who has retired, or a then-graduate student who no longer does research; researchers who can receive private funding will be less affected than those who can get only public funds, etc. In other words, the impact of the sanction will depend greatly on the specific situation of the researcher, i.e. on things utterly irrelevant to what the scientist did wrong.
There are no data available on the concrete consequences of fund debarment of various lengths (U.S. Office of Research Integrity [ORI], private communication, March 2008) . And one can expect that the consequences are not proportional to the length of the debarment. Someone devoid of funding for five or ten years must find a new occupation; in such a case the end of the sanction may be purely theoretical.
But is it not hypocritical to call it fund debarment if it really means expulsion from science? One, three, five years cannot be treated just as numbers: they have particular effects on scientists, and it is these consequences of the sanctions rather than the length of the debarment that should be proportional to the wrongness of what the researcher did. (This would require information that is not currently available.)
Certain consequences of a condemnation can randomly increase the sanction. As Babbage (1830) notes, "that part of the scientific world whose opinion is of most weight, is generally so unreasonable, as to neglect altogether the observations of those in whom they have, on any occasion, discovered traces of the artist" -if guilt is proven for one article it is assumed for all others. Moreover, each time someone writes on the subject of scientific fraud, decade-old deeds are once more associated with the name of a researcher so that "the potential negative impact on reputation [is] perpetuated (and hence punishment extended)" even though one could think that "someone who has made a mistake should be allowed the opportunity to rehabilitate his or her reputation" (Bird, 2004) .
C. On sanctioning negligence
Warren Schmaus (1983) takes negligence to be wrong because it springs from a failure to follow proper research procedures, in particular it is a lack of scrutiny of one's own work. The negligent researcher is not aware of the potential error (but should have been), whereas the reckless is aware of it and fails to act upon this knowledge. A practical problem is that identification of negligence will be influenced by hindsight bias. Indeed, when an error is uncovered, everyone will claim in retrospect that obviously the scientist should have spotted it -similar to sport fans who always know after the match what tactic to use. There are hundreds of things which may go wrong (and which the researcher is expected to prevent) but when it is known exactly what went wrong, this one thing tends to leap to the top of the list of what should have been tested. Negligence is thus likely to be overdiagnosed. And, contrary to the difficulty to show an intention to deceive, this artifact is naturally against the defendant, i.e. against presumption of innocence.
On the bright side, negligent errors are easily avoided: all one needs to do is check for possible artifacts and contaminations, repeat the experiments many times, etc. -all one needs is time and money, which are both plentiful. Naturally if one spends more time and money checking results, one spends less time and money generating new findings. Whether having fewer, more reliable results is better than more numerous but less reliable results is an open question. The ideal situation is probably enough verification to weed out the most egregious errors but not so much as to do nothing but check results. In other words, it is good that some results are invalid. (Thermodynamics tells us that a state devoid of defect is seldom the most favorable: entropy should be reduced only if this decreases free energy.) Science would not fare better if all negligent work were sanctioned, since it would force researchers to dedicate far more time and money to checking results. If any error that I could have detected can lead to loss of funding, infamy, and so on, I would indeed be more careful. In fact, I will be careful to the point of meaninglessness. And I could be accused of wasting money on unnecessary tests.
We may not need the same level of accuracy for all results. If I publish data that turn out to be of no interest to anyone then whether they are valid or not is rather unimportant -an error would affect a volume of the scientific record that no one ever browses anyway. If, on the other hand, my results attract lots of interest, many people will try to reproduce them, so one will soon find out about possible errors. The most scrupulous verifications should be saved for results that deserve them.
D. Fighting fraud is worse than fraud
Fighting fraud may have negative effects similar to those of fraud itself. If fraud is wrong because it wastes money then fighting it makes sense only if this saves money. If hiring new specialized employees instead of new postdocs and spending less time on research and more on paperwork costs more than fraud then fighting fraud is a waste of public money and should be fought. If fraud were actually a financial issue, then one would make sure that fighting fraud be not more costly than fraud itself. Firms have quality controls because very low quality costs them money and is bad publicity but, since overquality could cost more money than low quality, a reasonable trade-off is sought.
Similarly, the obsession with fraud may hinder science even more than fraud itself. Kenneth Pimple (1999) does not "fear that ORI (as it is currently constituted) will intentionally hamper science, but [he] know[s] that bureaucracies always cause trouble, even when they do not mean to." Dooley and Kerch (2000) note that "most researchers in the physical sciences are likely subject to a policy on scientific misconduct but are unaware of what would actually happen if they were accused of misconduct." Physicists should feel concerned only if they are likely to exclaim 'Someone must have been telling lies about me, I have done nothing wrong but, one morning, I was arrested.' If this is unlikely to occur then awareness is unneeded. And if this is a likely event where you live, learning about potential consequences of accusations of misconduct is not the answer: exile is. Sovacool (2005) wants to "penalize those who know of misconduct within their institution, harshening criminal statutes could motivate more colleagues to report violations" and notes that "criminalizing misconduct could also motivate scientists to be more careful in their research." In fact it would most likely "transform science so that . . . well, so that it isn't fun any more" (Pimple, 1999) . It would not motivate scientists but rather disgust them and incite them to find a different occupation. Orwellian science is an oxymoron, and should remain so.
IV. NEED SCIENTISTS BE HONEST?
As Table I shows, honesty is the best candidate to justify what is generally held as fraudulent and not fraudulent. But why should scientists be honest? In particular, one may ask whether honesty is a standard specific to science or if this requirement flows from a general social rule. (One may remark that the concept of disinterestedness introduced by Robert Merton (1942) was meant for researchers qua scientists, whereas nowadays they are rather treated qua employees: 'publish or perish' is a matter of management, not of science.)
A. Honesty as a general rule Schmaus (1983) attempts to "secure scientific honesty through special moral norms proscribing scientists from self-interested activity," and fails. Amongst other things, "it may be unjust or unfair to require that scientists be disinterested -unlike the rest of us." He concludes that "scientists who commit fraud thus violate not a moral rule that applies only to them and enjoins them from self-interested activity, but a moral rule that applies to everybody and requires scientists to do their duty." In other words, the requirement that scientists be honest is not specific to them: they must be honest because everyone (scientist or not) must be honest. In this view, those committing fraud do not break a rule specific to science, "rather, they would be in violation of the general moral rule requiring them to do their job honestly" (ibid.).
Professions such as sales and advertising rely on claims which (if not actually lies) at least qualify as misleading and intellectually dishonest. Similarly, campaigning politicians and their supporters may lie about what they would do if elected or about facts regarding themselves and their opponents. Lies about the supposed existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and about the supposed links between AlQaeda and Iraq had dramatic consequences -far more dramatic than research misconduct will ever have. It does not seem that honesty is required of everyone. Or if it is required in theory, in any case this requirement does not seem to be enforced (few other than scientists may need to find a new occupation if they are dishonest). And if it exists only in theory then scientists should feel free to be honest only in theory. So even if scientists are supposed to be honest in theory this does not justify any sanction against dishonest scientists. (One cannot say that the norm exists for everyone but should be more consistently enforced in science, since this would be as unfair as limiting the norm itself to science.) The attempt to justify sanctions against those who do not do their job honestly based on some general moral requirement thus fails.
B. Internal and external rules
Making honesty in research a specific moral rule and a general moral rule both failed. If one allows only for these two kinds of rules then one must say that society cannot impose celibacy to monks as a specific rule (monks do not perform a function upon which society places a high moral value), and since celibacy is not a general rule monks should not be celibate. This misses the point that celibacy is not imposed by society: it is self-imposed. Consequently, when a monk breaks his vow he can be expelled by his order, but society does not have a say in the matter because the rule broken was internal to the order. The rules of games and sports are not set by society either. No one external to the game can call fouls or sanction them outside the game, through imprisonment for instance. (Of course, if the athlete also breaks an external rule, society may intervene in this regard. One should nevertheless remark that when athletes break laws in the course of a match they will generally not be prosecuted by lay tribunals, for instance a player who hits an opponent may be expelled from the game but will not be sent to jail.) Science may likewise have internal rules explicitly proscribing certain behaviors. Hofmann (2007) even argues that "moral norms are not only needed to regulate science, they define it." Note that internality does not entail monopoly: it is possible that other professions have similar rules. (Schmaus (1984) "think[s] it only confuses things to consider the fraudulent scientist as violating some code of professional ethics, including some norm of 'disinterestedness.' To think of the scientist who commits fraud as the secular analogue to a mystic who has been caught breaking his or her vow of celibacy is to becloud the issue." In fact, I do not think he even considered this possibility: he only looked at external rules, not internal ones.) Someone who would break such a rule may face consequences within science, but not without it. If one takes honesty to be an internal rule (a 'house rule') of science then judgment and sanctions (if any) must be internal to science. And if one does not believe that there is such a rule then there can be no judgment at all. In any case, society (or an agency representing it) has no business judging and punishing dishonesty in researchers.
C. Why is honesty far more important than technical competence?
A one-year debarment from funding is seen as worse than not funding someone's projects during a given year. Withdrawal of an article because data were not valid (falsified) is taken to be worse than withdrawal of an article because data were not valid (due to an honest error). Harriet Zuckerman (1984) notes that negligent researchers are treated "with derision and contempt" whereas "because fraud also involves the violation of social norms defined as morally compelling, scientists respond to it with all the sting of moral indignation, denouncing it as a crime and labeling perpetrators as charlatans and scoundrels." Based on the usual definition of misconduct, someone who honestly tried and failed (possibly out of negligence) should not be punished, whereas someone who did not try must be punished. This means that failure to seek truth is worse than failure to find it. Naturally, lack of success in one's research will have negative consequences (e.g. lower likelihood of obtaining funding or promotion), but these are mild compared to those of fraud (infamy, loss of one's job and low probability of finding another, very long debarment from funding). This leads to the incongruous conclusion that in science honesty is far more important than technical competence. No justification is offered.
Let us take a few steps back and ask the plain question 'what should scientists do?'. If a given experimental setup is superior to others, researchers should use it. Even if the experimental results contradict one's theory, one should publish them. If results are inconsistent, the researcher should look for artifacts, repeat the experiments, and so on. Note that these are not in themselves moral or technical issues, they are just things scientists should do. The Greeks for instance did not have a sharp distinction between the moral and the non-moral: "The word aretê, which later comes to be translated as 'virtue', is in the Homeric poems used for excellence of any kind; a fast runner displays the aretê of his feet" (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 122) . A scientist must be technically competent and honest, just like a Greek fighter had to be skilled with weapons and courageous. Failing to be either means failing to be a good scientist or a good fighter. How to make honesty superiorly important? One may say that cheaters cannot be trusted, and "the institution of science involves an implicit social contract between scientists that each can depend on the trustworthiness of the rest" (Zuckerman, 1977, p. 113) . But, a scientist who cheated once may not cheat again (Bouville, 2008d) , and one could just as much say that someone who is incompetent or careless cannot be trusted because future results may be tainted by these flaws. Both technical incompetence and dishonesty can break trust.
It is far from obvious why lack of honesty should have much more dramatic consequences for the researcher than a lack of technical competence. Unless an argument is provided to make honesty superiorly important, intentional fraud should not be punished much more harshly than technical errors. This does not mean that scientists should be dishonest, simply that one is not required to make honesty infinitely more important than everything else.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the focus is generally on the administrative or judicial aspects of research misconduct, little attention is paid to arguments against scientific fraud. These arguments for the most part fail to prove wrong that which is typically considered misconduct (e.g. plagiarism). Moreover, they have consequences that are incompatible with current policies (especially the exclusion of honest errors from the definition of fraud) and have other unsightly logical consequences. Similarly the sanctions are not always consistent with the crimes; for instance, plagiarism does not waste public money and has no adverse effect on the population, so there is no reason why public agencies should sanction it, yet they do. Schmaus (1983) argues that there cannot be a specific moral duty of scientists to be honest and that they must be honest only because everyone must be. This is not very realistic: many people get away with being dishonest (or even make a living out of it), so one cannot say that everyone must really be honest. If there is no specific moral rule set by society enjoining scientists to be honest and no general moral rule set by society enjoining everyone to be honest, then if scientists must be honest it is based on some rule internal to science. A corollary is that society has no business enforcing this rule. Also, it is unclear why honesty should trump technique, i.e. why lack of honesty should be far worse than a lack of technical competence. Unless an argument is provided to make honesty superiorly important, intentional deception should not be much more harshly punished than technical errors.
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